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Abstract
This paper analyzes international high-skilled migration caused by financial fric-
tions in educational market. I develop a model of learning in which acquisition of skill
is only possible through personal interaction with a skilled individual; the income of
the skilled is sensitive to financial constraints for the unskilled. Cross-country differ-
ences in such constraints have a multiplicative effect on the skill premium, causing
outmigration of skilled individuals from a less developed country. I study welfare im-
plications of such brain drain for the sending and receiving countries. Although it
makes more difficult skill acquisition in the sending country, the unskilled may still be
better off: increased cost of skill acquisition is offset by higher income once the skill
has been acquired. For the receiving country, I identify a phenomenon of immiserizing
immigration: a depletion of the stock of skill in the sending country due to brain drain
hinders further production of skill, which may hurt the receiving country. Additionally,
I find that increased openness of the sending country to migration and the resultant
accelerated brain drain increase the incentives of the country government to reduce
financial frictions.
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1 Introduction
Despite the unprecedented development of long-distance communication technologies, knowl-
edge continues to diffuse from one person to another mainly by means of personal interaction.
One can become a scientist only through a continuous interaction with other scientists. In
stable political environments, virtually all successful politicians have an experience of in-
teraction with politicians from previous cohorts. In most jobs, young workers learn from
experienced workers. Teaching services continue to be local in nature, and university pro-
fessors in the United States do not expect that their jobs will ever be exported to India.
Even the acquisition of skills that are labeled by economists as “low,” such as taxi driving,
require frequent personal interaction with people who have been in the business for some
time. Numerous studies find that the first destination of immigrant workers is usually a
location where many immigrants from the same country live,1 despite the fact that the new
immigrants, whose skills are usually similar to that of incumbent immigrants, would face
less competition on the job market in other locations.
Given the local nature of transmission of productive knowledge, part of the welfare gain
from enhanced skills is likely to be shifted from the learners (young, unskilled workers) to the
teachers (experienced, skilled workers) through a bargaining process, pushing current income
flow of the learners below their current marginal product of labor, and vice versa, raising the
income of the teachers. Further, a compensation for education may have a multiplicative
effect on the willingness to acquire skill and on the return to skill. When skilled individuals
increase their earnings by receiving a compensation for education, unskilled individuals have
an increased willingness to acquire skill. Since the best way to acquire skill is to interact
with and learn from existing skilled individuals, the latter get a further increase in earnings,
further increasing the willingness of the unskilled to acquire skill. This multiplicative positive
effect on demand for education offsets the traditional law of demand and makes the demand
for education highly inelastic.
With inelastic demand, even small exogenous cross-country differences in the educational
technology, such as differences in student access to educational credit, may lead to large dif-
ferences in the return to skill and create a basis for brain drain from a country with a poor
access to educational credit. The objective of this paper is to examine, theoretically, the
effects of international migration of skilled individuals caused by such institutional differ-
ences, in a model of learning that captures the above mentioned stylized facts. The proposed
1E.g. Winters, Janvry, and Sadoulet (2001), Bauer, Epstein, and Gang (2007), Munshi (2003); Vergalli
(2006) provides a theoretical analysis of the location choice of migrants.
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theory differs from the existing literature that tends to explain international migration by
the differences in how much current output migrants can produce in different countries. The
theoretical model developed in this paper examines migration between countries with identi-
cal fundamental parameters (productivity of skilled and unskilled, the learning technology),
with the only exogenous heterogeneity being the heterogeneity of institutions that facilitate
the transfer of wealth from the unskilled to the skilled in compensation for education.
I find the welfare effects of international migration to be ambiguous for both sending and
receiving countries. For the sending country, the departure of a fraction of skilled workers
reduces the number of potential teachers and makes it more difficult to acquire skill (the
negative effect of openness). On the other hand, increased country openness increases the
return to skill, which makes unskilled individuals, who expect to acquire skill in the future,
better off (the positive effect of openness). I show that with very high transaction costs
in the home educational market, the negative effect of brain drain dominates, while with
medium values of transaction costs, the positive effect may overwhelm once the magnitude
of migration becomes sufficiently high.
For the receiving country, the welfare effects of skilled immigration are generally positive.
I show however that once the skilled emigration rate becomes sufficiently high, the number
of migrants begins to diminish, which hurts not only the sending but also the receiving
country. The explanation is simple: if skilled individuals are an essential input of new skill
production in the sending country, an excessive brain drain may reduce the number of skilled
individuals in the sending country by so much that it can no longer supply skilled individuals
to the receiving country. I label this phenomenon as immiserizing immigration by analogy
with Bhagwati’s immiserizing growth in the international trade literature. The immiserizing
immigration effect is also reminiscent of the overfishing effect in the Economics of natural
resources.
Additionally, I study the welfare gains of the sending country from a marginal increase
in the quality of educational credit institutions. I find that such gain is always higher
in a more open country: the welfare of the unskilled is more sensitive to the quality of
educational institutions when the skilled have a better opportunity to leave. Thus, the
increased openness and the resultant increased brain drain help “discipline”a home country
government to improve institutions facilitating education.
Although there exists an extensive literature on the diffusion of knowledge2 and on posi-
2Jovanovic and Rob (1989) is an example of theoretical analysis; Keller (2002) is an empirical account of
geographic localization; Keller (2004) contains a review of literature on knowledge spillovers.
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tive externalities of human capital,3 virtually all of this literature assumes that all the welfare
gains of skill acquisition accrue only to those who acquire the skill. Park (1997) is, to my
knowledge, the only discussion of the fact that part of the welfare gain may be shifted to
those skilled from whom new skill has been acquired. The main focus of Park (1997), how-
ever, is different from that of this paper, and does not include the examination of migration
patterns.
Much of the modern literature that relates education and migration begins with Stark,
Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997) and Mountford (1997) who point out the potential incen-
tive effect of a brain drain prospect: unskilled individuals who face a prospect of emigration
have an incentive to study more if emigration is conditioned on skill acquisition. Accord-
ing to the theories, brain drain may thus increase the total number of skilled in the world,
and, assuming that emigration is a probabilistic outcome, may even increase the number
of skilled that remain in the sending country. Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001) and
Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2008) take the theory to cross-country data; Chand and
Clemens (2008) tests the theory in the context of migration from Fiji to New Zealand. All
of these studies assume that the technology of skill acquisition does not include the presence
of individuals already possessing the skill, the assumption challenged in this paper.
The relationship between financial constraints and human capital accumulation has re-
ceived a considerable attention in the economic development literature. At the theoretical
level, Galor and Zeira (1993) is a seminal contribution to the area that shows that, in the
presence of financial constraints, a higher initial income inequality may lead the economy
to a poverty trap. Mejia and St-Pierre (2008) is a more recent theoretical investigation of a
related topic. On the empirical side, the issue has been studied, among others, by by Flug,
Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim (1998) who discover a significant and robust negative effect
of the financial constraints on the human capital accumulation; Schady (2004) examines the
effect of macroeconomic crises on education.
The role of this paper is combine, theoretically, the two stands of literature – the one that
relates educational attainment with migration prospects, and the one that relates educational
attainment with financial frictions – to analyze their interaction. In the remainder of the
paper, I first analyze a one-country (“closed economy”) dynamics and a steady-state, and
then proceed to a two-country setting to model migration between the two countries.
3This literature starts with Lucas (1988); applications of this concept to migration include Stark, Hel-
menstein, and Prskawetz (1997), Mountford (1997), Stark and Wang (2002), and Stark and Zakharenko
(2012).
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2 Closed Economy
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 Demographics
This is a general equilibrium dynamic model. Time is discrete; at each moment of time t,
there is a continuum of mass L of individuals that are endogenously divided into two types
– skilled and unskilled. I denote the fraction of skilled individuals in the economy in period
t by mt. Between any two time periods, a randomly selected fraction 1− δ of all individuals
dies. The same mass of new individuals is born; therefore, the total population remains
constant. Every newly-born individual is unskilled.
2.1.2 Consumption and savings
There is one consumption good, which is produced using the only input – skill – in a manner
specified below. The price of the good is normalized to unity. A representative individual
maximizes his discounted stream of consumption by:
Ui,t0 =
{ ∑
t=t0...∞
βt−t0ci,t if ci,t ≥ 0 ∀t
−∞ otherwise
(1)
where t0 is the birth date of the individual, t is the index of time, ct ≥ 0 is consumption
at time t, and β < 1 is the discount factor. Given that death is a random occurrence,
individuals do not know the moment of their death and calculate their utility on an infinite
time horizon. I assume that the death probability is already built into the discount factor
(thus β < δ < 1), and therefore the parameter δ does not explicitly enter the decision-making
process.
Individuals earn a stream of (stochastic) income which depends on skill and which is
detailed below; for now, denote it yi,t, t ≥ t0. Individuals borrow and save at rate rt. To
model financial frictions, we make a somewhat simplistic assumption that those who need to
borrow one dollar actually have to borrowK ≥ 1 dollars; the difference of K−1 dollars is the
sunk cost due to financial frictions. Throughout the paper, we refer to K as the “transaction
cost”; it reflects the quality of financial institutions in a country.
Denote by
ai,t ≡ yi,t − ci,t (2)
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the flow of savings and by Ai,t its stock at the beginning of period t; given the above
assumptions, the evolution of Ai,t is determined by
Ai,t+1 = ai,tK
I(ai,t<0) + (1 + rt)Ai,t (3)
where I(·) is the indicator function.
In every period, the savings rate rt is such that it clears the savings market:
∫
i
ai,tK
I(ai,t<0)di =
0, with the initial aggregate stock of savings also equal to zero. The dividends are payable
at the beginning of each period.
Given that the death occurrence is random, the average savings of those who die are
equal to the average savings of the entire population (i.e. zero). We assume that savings of
those who die are cleared, and all newly-born start with zero savings.
2.1.3 Production and learning
In each period of time, each skilled individual produces two types of output: one unit of
consumption good and one unit of teaching services. Both outputs are supplied inelastically.
The productivity of unskilled individuals is normalized to zero.4 The only way for un-
skilled individuals (students) to become skilled is through personal interaction with existing
skilled individuals (teachers). The process of learning is stochastic and depends on the learn-
ing intensity of students xi,t ≥ 0, which has two possible interpretations. First, it could be
viewed as a fraction of time a student has spent learning within each time period. Alterna-
tively, we can assume that all students learn full time, but in classes of variable sizes: low
intensity xi,t implies learning in a large class, while high intensity implies learning in a small
class, or individually, or even individually with several teachers. In this stylized model, xi,t
of a representative unskilled individual must be equal to the ratio of teachers to students in
equilibrium.
If an unskilled individual learns with intensity xi,t, his probability of becoming skilled
at that point in time is P (xi,t) where P : R+ → [0, 1] is a smooth, strictly increasing, and
strictly concave “learning” function that satisfies the following property:
P ′(0) >
1− δ
δ
(4)
Teaching services are supplied in an educational market at a prevalent “wage” (i.e. com-
4Generalizing the unskilled productivity to a positive value would reduce the incentive to acquire skill,
which would entail a lower return to skill, but it would not qualitatively change the results that follow.
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pensation for teaching), denoted wt. Thus the income of a skilled individual is yi,t = 1+wt,
while the income of the unskilled, net of educational expenses, is yi,t = −wtxi,t.
2.1.4 Objectives
The objective of an individual i is to maximize (1) by making savings decisions ai,t given
expectations about the flow of income, and subject to (2), (3), and to the transversality
condition
lim
t→∞
βt−t0ci,t = 0 (5)
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
Skilled individuals have reached their terminal state of knowledge, and supply both their
outputs, consumption good and teaching services, inelastically. As a result, the only decision
they have to make is the savings decision. The unskilled individuals make learning intensity
decisions xi,t and savings decisions ai,t. The appendix shows that, given that the utility
is linear in consumption, the financial part of the model, i.e. savings decisions, may be
suppressed to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. In the rest of the paper, we analyze
the simplified “savings-free” version of the model.
2.2.1 Skilled individuals
In the “savings-free” modification of the model, skilled individuals do not make any decisions
(as they supply both outputs, consumption good and teaching services, inelastically);5 the
value of being skilled is the discounted stream of future earnings:
vt1 ≡ v1(wt, wt+1, ...) =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(1 + wτ ) (6)
To analyze the aggregate supply of teaching services, it is sufficient to analyze the dy-
namics of the fraction of skilled individuals in the population, mt. Observe that, in the
closed economy, such fraction does not depend on transaction costs K and wage levels wτ :
the equilibrium learning intensity at time t, xt, is determined by the current proportion of
5One can develop a model in which skilled individuals have a tradeoff between production and teach-
ing, which would result in a traditional upward-sloping supply of teaching services. This would, however,
complicate the analysis that follows, without adding new insights to the migration part of the model.
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skilled to unskilled individuals,
xt =
mt
1−mt
(7)
while the dynamics of mt is fully determined by the learning intensity:
mt+1 = δ (mt + P (xt)(1−mt)) (8)
Taking into account (4), we can find that the dynamic system given by (7) and (8) has two
steady states: one, unstable, at mt = 0, and a stable one at some mt = mA ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
a closed economy that starts at time t0 from any mt0 ∈ (0, 1] converges to limt→∞mt = mA.
The corresponding value of the learning intensity is denoted by xA ≡
mA
1−mA
and is determined
by
P (xA)
xA
=
1− δ
δ
(9)
2.2.2 Unskilled individuals, demand for education and its properties
The appendix demonstrates that the “savings-free” unskilled optimization problem may be
reduced to the following:
vt0 = max
z
(
−Kwtz + β
[
P (z)vt+11 + (1− P (z))v
t+1
0
])
(10)
Denote by xD(wt, wt+1, ...;K) the argmaximum of (10), and by V (z;wt, wt+1, ...;K) its max-
imand:
V (z;wt, wt+1, ...;K) = −Kwtz + β
[
P (z)vt+11 + (1− P (z))v
t+1
0
]
(11)
We next outline some properties of the demand for education.
Lemma 1 The difference between the values of being skilled and unskilled, vt1−v
t
0 = v1(wt, wt+1, ...)−
v0(wt, wt+1, ...;K), is increasing in wτ for every t and for every τ ≥ t, such that
∂(vt1 − v
t
0)
∂wt
= 1 +KxDt > 0 (12)
∂(vt1 − v
t
0)
∂wt+k
∣∣∣∣
k>0
= βk
k−1∏
i=0
(1− P (xDt+i))(1 +Kx
D
t+k) > 0 (13)
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Proof. For every t, we have that
∂vt
1
∂wt
= 1, while
∂vt
0
∂wt
= −KxDt , hence (12). To prove (13),
observe that
∂vt
1
∂wt+k
= βk = β
∂vt+1
1
∂wt+k
, while
∂vt0
∂wt+k
= βP (xDt )
[
∂vt1
∂wt+k
−
∂vt0
∂wt+k
]
The difference between the two is then
∂vt1
∂wt+k
−
∂vt0
∂wt+k
= β(1− P (xDt ))
[
∂vt+11
∂wt+k
−
∂vt+10
∂wt+k
]
By iterating the last result, we obtain (13).
Lemma 1 is used in the proof of the following
Proposition 1 The optimal demand for education xD(wt, wt+1, ...;K) is decreasing in cur-
rent wage wt and is increasing in every subsequent wage wτ , τ > t.
Proof. From the implicit function theorem it follows that
∂xDt
∂wτ
=
∂2Vt
∂z∂wτ
−∂
2Vt
∂z2
(14)
Given concavity of Vt with respect to z, the denominator of (14) is positive and therefore
the sign of ∂xt
∂wτ
is equal to the sign of ∂
2Vt
∂z∂wτ
. The latter is equal to
∂2Vt
∂z∂wt
= −K < 0
∂2Vt
∂z∂wτ
∣∣∣∣
τ>t
= βP ′(z)
[
∂vt+11
∂wτ
−
∂vt+10
∂wτ
]
> 0
The optimal demand for education increases in future wages for two reasons. First,
should the individual become skilled in the future, his wealth will be improved by higher
future wage, hence the willingness to increase the likelihood to become skilled by demanding
more education today, which we call the income effect. Second, should the individual remain
unskilled in the future, his cost of education in the future will be increased by higher future
teacher’s wage, hence the willingness to reduce the likelihood of remaining unskilled and
demand more education today, which we call the substitution effect. Figure 1 displays the
demand for education xt, as a function of current wage wt, assuming that future wages
wτ , τ > t are held time-invariant at various levels.
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xDt
wt
low wτ
high wτ
Steady state
wτ = wt
Figure 1: Demand for education xDt as function of current wage wt at various levels of future
wage wτ
2.2.3 Equilibrium wage path
The equilibrium wage path is determined by setting the demanded learning intensity xD(wt, wt+1, ...;K)
equal to the supplied learning intensity xt, defined by (7), at every time period t ∈ [t0,∞).
2.3 Steady state analysis
In a steady state where the wage is constant over time, wt = w, the value of being skilled
(6) simplifies to
v1(w) =
1 + w
1− β
(15)
while the steady-state supply of teaching services is given by (9).
The steady-state version of the value of being unskilled, (10), is:
v0(w,K) = max
z≥0
(−Kwz + β [P (z)v1(w) + (1− P (z))v0(w,K)]) (16)
The following Proposition characterizes the steady-state demand for education by un-
skilled individuals.
Proposition 2 The demand for skill by the unskilled individuals, x(w,K), is characterized
by
w ≥
G(x(w,K))
K −G(x(w,K))
(17)
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with strict equality if x(w,K) > 0, where
G(x) ≡
P ′(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
(18)
s(x) ≡ P (x)− P ′(x)x (19)
Refer to the Appendix for proof.
From the properties of P (x), it follows that s(x) is increasing from zero to one, while
G(x) is decreasing from G(0) = β
1−β
P ′(0) to zero.
Define by x(K) the lower bound of demand:
x(K) ≡ min
w
x(w,K) = x(∞, K)
When transaction costs are sufficiently low, K < G(0) = P ′(0) β
1−β
, demand for education is
bounded away from zero, x(K) > 0 and is determined by
G(x(K)) = K (20)
which can be interpreted as follows. A marginal increase of w has two effects. First, w can be
seen as a tuition, and the law of demand prescribes unskilled individuals to demand less of
teaching services when tuition increases. Second, an increased w means an increased return to
skill (since education is provided by skilled individuals), which means an increased willingness
to acquire skill, implying an increased demand for education. With high transaction costs K,
the former effect overwhelms the latter, and demand for education is a standard textbook
demand function with negative and bounded away from zero own-price elasticity. When
transaction costs K are sufficiently low, the two effects offset each other, and the learning
intensity approaches its lower bound x > 0, while demand elasticity approaches zero, as the
tuition w approaches infinity.
Next, we investigate the steady-state expected value (“welfare”) of being unskilled v0(w,K).
Lemma 2
v0(w,K) =
w + 1
1− β
S(x(w,K)) (21)
S(x(w,K)) ≡
s(x(w,K))
1−β
β
+ s(x(w,K))
(22)
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The proof is contained in Appendix.
How does v0(w,K) depend on its arguments? The effect of increased transaction costs
K is rather obvious: at a constant wage w, a rise in the transaction costs must be offset by a
proportional rise in G(x) (cf.(17)), which implies a decline in learning intensity x. A decline
in x causes a decline in welfare (21).
The effect of an increased wage is less obvious: besides the direct positive effect, it has
a negative effect on demanded learning intensity x(w,K) thus the total effect is uncertain.
The Proposition below clarifies the ambiguity.
Proposition 3 At a given K, the welfare v0(w,K) reaches its minimum at w
∗(K) and
x∗(K) = x(w∗(K), K) such that
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K)
≤
1− β
β
K (23)
with strict equality if x∗(K) > 0. Moreover, welfare increases with w when w > w∗(K)
(x < x∗(K)) and decreases when w < w∗(K) (x > x∗(K)). In other words, the point
(x∗(K), w∗(K)) is the unique point of minimum welfare on the demand curve (17).
Proof. The statement is proved by direct computation and analysis of the first derivative
of (21) with respect to w.
(1− β)
∂v0(w,K)
∂w
= S(x) + (w + 1)
∂S(x)
∂x
(
∂w
∂x
)−1
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(17)
S(x) +
K
K −G(x)
∂S(x)
∂x
(K −G(x))2
K
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)−1
= S(x) + (K −G(x))
∂S(x)
∂x
(
∂G(x)
dx
)−1
(24)
The Appendix proves that (24) is equal to
(1− β)
∂v0
∂w
=
P (x)− 1−β
β
Kx(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
which is positive if x < x∗(K) (w > w∗(K)), negative if x > x∗(K) (w < w∗(K)), and
is zero otherwise. Thus, a country with transaction costs K reaches the minimum of its
steady-state welfare when the steady-state wage is equal to w∗(K) and learning intensity is
equal to x∗(K).
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We next investigate the relationship between points of demanded learning intensity min-
imum x(K), unskilled welfare argminimum x∗(K), and autarky learning intensity xA.
Proposition 4 (a) If K ≥ P ′(0) β
1−β
, then 0 = x(K) = x∗(K) < xA.
(b) If K < P ′(0) β
1−β
, then 0 < x(K) < x∗(K) < xA and both x(K) and x
∗(K) are strictly
diminishing with K.
Proof.
(a) If K ≥ P ′(0) β
1−β
, the denominator of (17) is positive at every positive value of learning
intensity x, and therefore the wage achieves its upper bound at x(K) = 0. To prove
x∗(K) = 0, suppose the opposite, x∗(K) > 0. Then we have that
P ′(0) ≤ K
1− β
β
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(23)
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K)
<︸︷︷︸
P ′′(·)<0
lim
z→0
P (z)
z
=︸︷︷︸
L’Hopital’s rule
P ′(0)
which is a contradiction.
(b) When K < P ′(0) β
1−β
, the value of x(K) is determined by (20), the left-hand side of
which is decreasing in x. At x = 0, the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand
side, hence the equality is achieved at x(K) > 0. Additionally, an increase in K
increases the right-hand side of (20), hence the equality is achieved at a lower value of
x, meaning ∂x(K)
∂K
< 0.
To prove x∗(K) > x(K), observe that
β
1− β
P ′(x∗(K)) <
β
1− β
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K)
≡ K ≡ G(x(K)) ≡
P ′(x(K))
1−β
β
+ s(x(K))
<
β
1− β
P ′(x(K))
By assumption, P ′(x) is strictly decreasing in x, which ensures x∗(K) > x(K).
To prove ∂x
∗(K)
∂K
< 0, observe that the left-hand side of (23) is decreasing in x, hence a
higher value of K yields a lower x.
To prove x∗(K) < xA, observe that
β
1− β
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K)
≡ K ≥ 1 ≡
δ
1− δ
P (xA)
xA
>
β
1− β
P (xA)
xA
The ratio P (x)
x
is strictly decreasing in x, which ensures x∗(K) < xA.
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xw
x∗(K)
w∗(K)
xAx(K)
Figure 2: Isowelfare lines versus the demand curve
Figure 2 illustrates the point of welfare minimum on a typical demand curve.
3 International migration
3.1 Overview
In this paper, I suggest a new potential cause of the brain drain from less developed to more
developed countries. Even if the origin and destination countries have identical “real-sector”
parameters such as marginal product of labor of both skilled and unskilled workers, fertility,
life expectancy, and learning technology, brain drain may still exist due to differences in the
technology of transferring wealth from those who are willing to acquire skill to those who
provide teaching services. Such differences, manifested in the form of costs of transactions
between teachers and students, lead to differences in return to skill across countries. More-
over, lower return to skill in a less developed country decreases the willingness to acquire
such skill, which leads to further decrease in return to skill. This multiplicative effect of
institutional differences creates an incentive for skilled individuals to migrate from less de-
veloped to more developed countries. In this section, I conduct a formal analysis of this
effect and study its welfare implications.
To isolate the proposed effect, I assume that all other characteristics of the origin and
the destination countries of migrants, such as labor productivity or “psychic costs” of living,
14
are equal across countries; the only difference among countries is the ease of borrowing for
students. If students have limited access to credit, they offer lower rewards to their teachers
which makes the latter emigrate; students’ access to education thus becomes limited.
Suppose there are two countries, North, with low transaction costs KN = 1, and less
developed South with higher transaction costs KS > KN . I make a simplistic assumption
that the number of births each period in each country is fixed and does not depend on
migration patterns; this way, the number of individuals of a given nationality is exogenous.
In country i, the number of births is (1−δ)Li, so that the number of nationals of the country
is equal to Li and is not affected by migration patterns.
Only skilled individuals can migrate across countries; this assumption is consistent with
the selective immigration policy exercised by most developed recipient countries. An individ-
ual who chooses to migrate pays a one-time migration cost M .6 Thus, migration is possible
when the cost of doing so is low enough: M ≤
wAN−w
A
S
1−β
, where wAi is the autarky wage.
3.2 Wage curve
Under the assumption of sufficiently low cost of migration, the Northern and Southern wages
are related as follows:
wS = wN − (1− β)M
or, equivalently, (cf.(17))
G(xS)
KS −G(xS)
=
G(xN )
KN −G(xN )
− (1− β)M (25)
Equation (25) defines a hypersurface in the (xN , xS) space, which we refer to as the wage
curve. The wage curve originates from the (x(KN), x(KS)) point and slopes upward; a
decrease of migration cost M results in a lower xS (i.e. higher wS) at a given xN , hence a
reduction of migration costs rotates the wage curve clockwise in the (xN , xS) space.
6One important phenomenon not captured in this paper is that limited access to credit negatively affects
not only the acquisition of skill, but also the ability of individuals to migrate. In this paper, the cost of
migration M is assumed to be independent of institutions K: skilled individuals that consider migration are
assumed to have enough funds for such migration.
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3.3 Demographic balance curve
Denote by r the endogenous fraction of skilled Southerners who emigrate to the North; then,
the steady-state learning intensity of Northern students is
xN =
mN + r
LS
LN
mS
1−mN
(26)
while the learning intensity of Southern students is
xS =
(1− r)mS
1−mS
(27)
The steady-state share of skilled of nationality i ∈ {N, S} is determined by (cf.(8))
mi = δ (mi + P (xi)(1−mi)) (28)
By manipulating with (26), (27), and (28), this system of four equations with five un-
knowns may be reduced to the following equation with two unknowns:
LND(xN ) = −LSD(xS) (29)
D(x) ≡
(1− δ)x− δP (x)
(1− δ) + δP (x)
(30)
Equation (29) defines another hypersurface in the (xN , xS) space, referred to as the demo-
graphic balance curve. The function D(x) is equal to the per-capita demand for educational
services in a country, (1−δ)x
(1−δ)+δP (x)
= (1 − m)x, minus the per-capita supply of educational
services by the skilled nationals of that country, regardless of their country of residence,
δP (x)
(1−δ)+δP (x)
= m. Naturally, both sides of (29) must be equal to the supply of Southern
educational services in the North, which is also equal to the number of Southern migrants.
The following Lemma outlines the properties of D(·).
Lemma 3 The function D(·) has the following properties:
(a) D(0) = D(xA) = 0;
(b) It has a unique extremum xD ∈ (0, xA) such that
(P ′(xD)− s(xD))
δ
1− δ
≡ 1 (31)
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x(KN)
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Figure 3: Steady states with migration
D(·) is decreasing on [0, xD] and increasing thereafter;
(c) xD > x(K) for every K ≥ 1.
Proof. Item (a) is proved by direct computation of D(0) and D(xA). For (b), we calculate
the first derivative of D:
D′(x) = (1− δ)
(1− δ) + δ(s(x)− P ′(x))
[(1− δ) + δP (x)]2
(32)
The numerator is increasing in its argument from −∞ to 1, and is equal to zero at xD, which
proves (b). For (c), proof is trivial if x(K) = 0. Otherwise observe that
δ
1− δ
(P ′(xD)− s(xD)) ≡ 1 ≤ K ≡︸︷︷︸
cf.(20)
β
1− β
(P ′(x(K))−Ks(x(K))) <
δ
1− δ
(P ′(x(K))− s(x(K)))
The fact that P ′(x)− s(x) is strictly decreasing in its argument proves the claim.
The steady-state levels of learning intensity in both countries, xN and xS , is then deter-
mined by the intersection of the wage curve (25) and the demographic balance curve (29),
which are illustrated by Figure 3. Since South is assumed to be less developed, migration
occurs from North to South, decreasing xS, the proportion of remaining in the South skilled
to Southern unskilled.
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3.4 Immiserizing immigration
As seen on Figure 3, when brain drain from the South becomes sufficiently large, and the
Southern learning intensity xS falls below xD, further increases in the volumes of brain drain
not increase but decrease the learning intensity in the North – a phenomenon I label as the
immiserizing immigration, following Bhagwati’s immiserizing growth (Bhagwati 1958). The
immiserizing immigration is due to the fact that increasing openness of the South has two
effects: (i) it increases the share of Southern skilled that migrate, r, and (ii) decreases the
total number of Southern skilled, mSLS. The stock of Southern migrants in the North is
the product of the two. With low migration rates, the first effect dominates, but as the cost
of migration continues to decline, the second effect may overwhelm, reducing the number of
skilled individuals not only in the South (the standard brain drain effect) but also in the
North. In the most extreme case, when every Southern skilled emigrates, Southern unskilled
have no one to learn from and thus there is no production of skill in the South, meaning
that North has only as many skilled individuals as it can produce on its own.
3.5 Welfare effects of brain drain
To analyze the steady-state effects of a change of various model parameters, it is necessary
to introduce the notion “welfare” in the proposed model. To fix ideas, by “welfare” I assume
the value of being newly born in a steady state. In other words, does a change of a model
parameter make, on average and in the long run, happier those individuals who have just
entered this world? Since all newly-born are unskilled, it is sufficient to analyze the steady-
state value of being unskilled, v0(w,K).
With the results of Proposition 3, we can state the welfare effects of brain drain from
South to North. The effects depend on relationship between Southern welfare-minimizing
point x∗(KS) and immiserizing immigration point xD.
Proposition 5 A lowered migration cost M and an associated increase in migration rate r
have the following welfare effects:
In the South, welfare declines if initial migration rate is low such that xS ∈ (x
∗(KS), xA],
and increases if initial migration rate is high such that xS ∈ (x(KS), x
∗(KS)].
In the North, welfare increases if initial migration rate is low such that xS ∈ (xD, xA], and
declines if initial migration rate is high such that xS ∈ (x(KS), xD].
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In other words, if initial migration rate is low, its increase benefits North and hurts South; the
opposite happens if migration is high. The relationship between Southern welfare minimum
point x∗(KS) and Northern welfare maximum point xD depends on the value of KS. Thus, if
KS is low, there may be a region when both North and South benefit from increasing brain
drain (xS ∈ (xD, x
∗(KS))); a high KS implies the existence of a region when both North and
South lose from increased brain drain (xS ∈ (x
∗(KS), xD)).
Proof. The results for the South follow directly from the definition of x∗(KS), the welfare
minimum point. The results for the North follow from the fact that xN > xA > x
∗(KN),
thus welfare increases with xN , and from the fact that xN is increased by Southern brain
drain if xS ∈ (xD, xA), and is decreased otherwise.
3.6 Reduction of transaction costs
It is intuitively obvious that lowered transaction costs K lead to increased welfare. Improve-
ment of financial institutions, however, usually comes at a social cost, and it is therefore
useful to know whether greater openness of a country to migration increases or decreases
the social gain from lower transaction costs. For mathematical tractability of subsequent
analysis, we assume henceforth that North is a large country and is not affected by migration
patterns; then, (25) implies that Southern wage does not depend on Southern transaction
costs KS because it is pinned down by (and is inversely related to) migration costs M . This
property enables us to interpret any change is Southern wage as the effect of an inverse
change of migration costs, and to study the interaction between transaction and migration
costs in the K − w space.
Figure 4 plots the isowelfare lines of the newly born in the space of transaction costs K
and wage w. The position of isowelfare lines can be predicted by Proposition 4 which states,
among other things, the following: if transaction costs are high K ≥ P ′(0) β
1−β
, the welfare
minimum point is achieved at x∗(K) = 0 and thus at w∗(K) =∞, i.e. welfare declines with
increasing wage and the isowelfare curves must be downward sloping. With low transaction
costs K < P ′(0) β
1−β
, minimum welfare is achieved at some intermediary (x∗(K), w∗(K)) such
that x∗(K) decreases with K from a positive finite value to zero, and thus w∗(K) increases
with K from a positive finite value to infinity. Isowelfare lines are downward sloping below
w∗(K) and are upward sloping above.
The following proposition helps to analyze the (horizontal) distance between isowelfare
lines.
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Kw
w∗(K)
Figure 4: Isowelfare lines of newly born in the K − w space
Proposition 6 A greater openness of South to migration and an associated increased wage
w, lead to a higher marginal gain from lowered transaction costs:
d
dw
∣∣∣∣dv0(w,K)dK
∣∣∣∣ = − d2v0dwdK > 0
In other words, the horizontal distance between isowelfare curves diminishes as the wage rises:
with higher wage due to greater openness, an equivalent reduction of transaction costs leads
to a greater welfare gain (more isowelfare lines are crossed). Thus, as less developed South
becomes more open, its government has a higher incentive to improve financial institutions.
Refer to the Appendix for the proof of the Proposition.
4 Conclusion
Modern civilization is only possible because people acquire most of their human capital from
those who already possess it rather than accumulate it in isolation. While this phenomenon
is well-studied at both theoretical and empirical levels, its logical extension that knowledge
transfer from skilled to unskilled may be compensated by the latter, and that this compen-
sation may positively affect the willingness to acquire skill, received little attention in the
literature. In the present paper, I elaborate on this idea by developing a simple general
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equilibrium model of skill acquisition, in which the unskilled individuals acquire skill only
by interacting with the skilled, and by compensating the latter for knowledge transfer they
generate. An exogenous increase in the demand for education, for example, due to lower
costs of transaction between learners and teachers, has a multiplicative effect: it leads to an
increase in the return to skill, which encourages the unskilled to acquire even more skill and
boosts the demand for education even further.
I apply this idea to a model of international migration between countries with exogenously
different ability of the unskilled to pay for their education, which leads to large differences in
the return to skill and creates a basis for skilled migration from a less developed country to
a more developed country. I find that an increased openness of the less developed country to
such emigration may lead to an increase of welfare of the unskilled, despite the fact that they
lose potential teachers, when transaction costs in the less developed country are sufficiently
low. I also find that such increased openness increases economic payoffs to improvement of
institutions.
Appendix
Optimal savings and “savings-free” optimization problem By assumptions of the
model, the life of an individual is divided into two time periods: first, they are unskilled,
have no income, and have to borrow to fund education; second, they become skilled and earn
positive income. To balance the savings market, skilled individuals should (on average) thus
make positive savings.
The optimization problem of a skilled individual is
v˜t1(Ai,t) = max
ai,t
yi,t − ai,t + βv˜
t+1
1 (ai,tK
I(ai,t<0) + (1 + rt)Ai,t) (33)
subject to ai,t ≤ yi,t and to the transversality condition (5), where v˜
t
1(Ai,t) is the value of
being skilled with assets Ai,t at the beginning of period t, and yi,t = 1 + wt is the income of
a skilled individual. The first-order condition of the maximum is then
β
dv˜t+11
dAi,t+1


< 1
K
, ai,t = a
min
t
= 1
K
, ai,t ∈
(
amint , 0
)
∈
[
1
K
, 1
]
, ai,t = 0
= 1, ai,t ∈ (0, yi,t)
> 1, ai,t = yi,t
(34)
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where amint is the minimum possible level of savings flow imposed by the transversality
condition. The functional equation (33) can be shown to have the following solution:
v˜t1(Ai,t) = (1 + rt)Ai,t + v
t
1 (35)
where vt1 is defined by (6); thus,
dv˜t+1
1
dAi,t+1
is equal to 1 + rt. To ensure that any skilled
individual makes positive savings, it must be that (1 + rt)β ≥ 1, which also ensures that
every skilled individual makes nonnegative savings. Further, skilled individuals ever enjoy
positive consumption and the savings market clears only if
(1 + rt)β = 1 (36)
which implies that the equilibrium savings rate equals the discount rate.
The optimization problem of the unskilled individual is
v˜t0(Ai,t) = max
ai,t,xi,t
−ai,t − wtxi,t + β
[
P (xi,t)v˜
t+1
1 (Ai,t+1) + (1− P (xi,t))v˜
t+1
0 (Ai,t+1)
]
(37)
where Ai,t+1 = ai,tK
I(ai,t<0) + (1 + rt)Ai,t, and subject to
ai,t + wtxi,t ≤ 0 (38)
and to the transversality condition (5). Note that the constraint (38) implies that the
savings are non-positive (i.e. unskilled individuals borrow). The first-order conditions of the
maximum are then
− 1 + βK
(
P (xi,t)
dv˜t+11
dAi,t+1
+ (1− P (xi,t))
dv˜t+10
dAi,t+1
)
+ λi,t = 0 (39)
−wt + βP
′(xi,t)
(
v˜t+11 (Ai,t+1)− v˜
t+1
0 (Ai,t+1)
)
+ λi,twt = 0 (40)
where λi,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (38). The functional equation (37)
can be shown to have the following solution:
v˜t0(Ai,t) = (1 + rt)Ai,t + v
t
0 (41)
where vt0 is defined by (10). Therefore, we have that
dv˜t+1
0
dAi,t+1
=
dv˜t+1
1
dAi,t+1
= 1 + rt, thus the
first-order condition for savings, (39), simplifies to βK(1 + rt) + λi,t = 1. Using (36), we
conclude that λi,t = 1 − K. Using this finding and the equations (35) and (41), we can
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rewrite the first-order condition for x, (40), as follows:
−Kwt + βP
′(xi,t)
(
vt+11 − v
t+1
0
)
= 0 (42)
which coincides with the first-order condition of the “savings-free” optimization problem
described by (10). In other words, for the analysis of optimal educational decisions, the
savings part of the model may be suppressed.
Proof of Proposition 2 Maximization of (16) with respect to learning intensity z results
in the following first-order condition:
−Kw + βP ′(x(w,K))(v1(w)− v0(w,K))
{
= 0 x > 0
≤ 0 x = 0
(43)
where x(w,K) is the argmax of (16). Solving for v1− v0, we get (all subsequent inequalities
hold with equality if x > 0)
(v1(w)− v0(w,K)) ≤
Kw
βP ′(x(w,K))
(44)
Substituting the inequality for v1 − v0 back into (16) yields, after some rearrangement,
(1− β)v0(w,K) ≤ −Kwx(w,K) +Kw
P (x(w,K))
P ′(x(w,K))
Given that (cf.(15)) v0(w,K) = v1(w)− (v1(w)−v0(w,K)) ≥
1+w
1−β
− Kw
βP ′(x(w,K))
, we have that
(1 + w)−Kw
1− β
βP ′(x(w,K))
≤ (1− β)v0(w,K) ≤ Kw
(
P (x(w,K))
P ′(x(w,K))
− x(w,K)
)
Rearranging, we get
1 + w
Kw
≤
P (x(w,K))
P ′(x(w,K))
− z +
1− β
β
1
P ′(x(w,K))
=
1−β
β
+ P (x(w,K))− P ′(x(w,K))x(w,K)
P ′(x(w,K))
=
1
G(x(w,K))
where G is defined in (18). Solving for w, we get (17).
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Proof of Lemma 2 If w and K are such that x(w,K) = 0, proof is trivial since v0 = 0.
Otherwise, from (43), we have that
v0(w,K) = v1(w)−
Kw
βP ′(x(w,K))
(45)
From (15), we know that v1(w) =
1+w
1−β
. From (17), we have that (the arguments of x(w,K)
are dropped for brevity) Kw = (w + 1) P
′(x)
1−β
β
+P (x)−P ′(x)x
, which allows us to rewrite (45) as
follows:
v0(w,K) = (w + 1)
[
1
1− β
−
1
(1− β) + β(P (x)− P ′(x)x)
]
= (w + 1)
1
1− β
β(P (x)− P ′(x)x)
(1− β) + β(P (x)− P ′(x)x)
= v1(w)
P (x)− P ′(x)x
1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x
= v1(w)
s(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
Proof of Proposition 3 continued
S(x) + (K −G(x))
∂S(x)
∂x
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)−1
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(18),(19),(22)
s(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
+
(
K −
P ′(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
)
1−β
β
x
1−β
β
+ P (x)
=
(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
(P (x)− P ′(x)x)−
(
K 1−β
β
+Ks(x)− P ′(x)
)
1−β
β
x(
1−β
β
+ s(x)
)(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
=
P
(
1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x
)
− 1−β
β
Kx
(
1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x
)
(
1−β
β
+ s(x)
)(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
=
P (x)− 1−β
β
Kx(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
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Proof of Proposition 6 ∂
2v0
∂w∂K
= ∂
∂K
∂v0
∂w
can be obtained by differentiating (24) with
respect to K. We get:
∂
∂K
(
S(x(w,K)) + (K −G(x(w,K)))
∂S(x(w,K))
∂x
(
∂G(x(w,K))
∂x
)−1)
= (K −G(x))
∂
∂x
(
∂S(x)
∂x
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)−1)
∂x
∂K
+
∂S(x)
∂x
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)−1
(46)
To prove that (46) is negative, it is sufficient to show that each of its two components is
negative. Indeed, in the first component that consists of three multipliers, two multipliers
are positive while the third is negative:
K −G(x) > 0
∂
∂x
(
∂S(x)
∂x
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)−1)
=
∂
∂x
(
1−β
β
x
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
=
(
1− β
β
) 1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)2 > 0
We can compute ∂x
∂K
from (17), using the implicit function theorem and holding w fixed:
∂x
∂K
= G(x)
K
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)−1
< 0 due to ∂G(x)
∂x
< 0.
The second component of (46) is also negative because ∂S(x)
∂x
> 0 while ∂G(x)
∂x
< 0.
References
Bauer, T., G. Epstein, and I. Gang (2007): “The Influence of Stocks and Flows on
Migrants’ Location Choices,” Research in Labor Economics, 26, 199–229.
Beine, M., F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport (2001): “Brain drain and economic growth:
theory and evidence,” Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 275–289.
(2008): “Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries:
Winners and Losers.,” Economic Journal, 118(528), 631 – 652.
Bhagwati, J. (1958): “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note,” The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 25(3), pp. 201–205.
Chand, S., and M. Clemens (2008): “Skilled emigration and skill creation: A quasi-
experiment,” Crawford School of Economics and Government working papers.
25
Commander, S. J., M. Kangasniemi, and L. A. Winters (2003): “The Brain Drain:
Curse or Boon?,” SSRN eLibrary.
Flug, K., A. Spilimbergo, and E. Wachtenheim (1998): “Investment in education: do
economic volatility and credit constraints matter?,” Journal of Development Economics,
55(2), 465 – 481.
Galor, O., and J. Zeira (1993): “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 60(1), 35–52.
Hanson, G. H. (2009): “The Economic Consequences of the International Migration of
Labor,” Annual Review of Economics, 1(1), 179–208.
Haque, N. U., and S.-J. Kim (1995): ““Human Capital Flight”: Impact of Migration on
Income and Growth,” Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund, 42(3), 577–607.
Jovanovic, B., and R. Rob (1989): “The Growth and Diffusion of Knowledge,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 56(4), 569–582.
Keller, W. (2002): “Geographic Localization of International Technology Diffusion,” The
American Economic Review, 92(1), 120–142.
(2004): “International Technology Diffusion,” Journal of Economic Literature,
42(3), 752–782.
Lucas, R. E. (1988): “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 22(1), 3 – 42.
Mejia, D., and M. St-Pierre (2008): “Unequal opportunities and human capital forma-
tion,” Journal of Development Economics, 86(2), 395 – 413.
Mountford, A. (1997): “Can a brain drain be good for growth in the source economy?,”
Journal of Development Economics, 53, 287–303(17).
Munshi, K. (2003): “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S.
Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549–599.
Park, K. S. (1997): “A Theory of on-the-Job Learning,” International Economic Review,
38(1), 61–81.
26
Schady, N. R. (2004): “Do Macroeconomic Crises Always Slow Human Capital Accumu-
lation?,” The World Bank Economic Review, 18(2), 131–154.
Stark, O., C. Helmenstein, and A. Prskawetz (1997): “A brain gain with a brain
drain,” Economic Letters, 55, 227–234.
Stark, O., and Y. Wang (2002): “Inducing human capital formation: migration as a
substitute for subsidies,” Journal of Public Economics, 86(1), 29 – 46.
Stark, O., and R. Zakharenko (2012): “Differential Migration Prospects, Skill Forma-
tion, and Welfare,” Review of International Economics, forthcoming.
Vergalli, S. (2006): “The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics,” SSRN eLibrary.
Winters, P., A. d. Janvry, and E. Sadoulet (2001): “Family and Community Net-
works in Mexico-U.S. Migration,” The Journal of Human Resources, 36(1), 159–184.
27
